

# Migration strategies of crisis-stricken youth in an enlarged European Union<sup>1</sup>

Transfer

19(3) 365–380

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DOI: 10.1177/1024258913493701

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## Summary

This article studies the migration response of young people from new EU Member States to disparate conditions in an enlarged European Union at the onset of the Great Recession. We use Eurobarometer data and probabilistic econometric models to identify the key drivers of the intention to work in another Member State of the European Economic Area (EEA) and the expected duration of stays abroad. We find that migration intentions are high among those not married and among males with children, but both categories are also over-represented among people with only temporary as opposed to long-term or permanent migration plans. Whereas age affects migration intentions negatively, education has no effect on whether working abroad is envisaged. However, conditional on envisaging working abroad, completion of education (if after the 16th birthday) is associated with long-term (at least five years), but not permanent, migration plans. These results suggest a potential for brain circulation rather than brain drain. Finally, we find that socio-demographic variables explain about as much variation of migration intentions as self-reported push and pull factors and migration constraints.

## Résumé

L'article examine la migration comme réponse des jeunes des nouveaux États membres de l'UE confrontés à la différence de conditions dans une Union européenne élargie à l'approche de la grande récession. Les auteurs utilisent les données de l'Eurobaromètre et des modèles économétriques probabilistes pour identifier les principaux facteurs qui déterminent le choix d'aller travailler dans un autre État membre de l'Espace économique européen (EEE) et la durée prévue des séjours à l'étranger. Il s'avère que les intentions de migration sont élevées parmi les célibataires

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1 The authors thank an anonymous referee and the responsible editor for providing a number of suggestions that helped to improve the article significantly. We remain responsible for any mistakes still present.

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et les pères de famille mais aussi que ces catégories sont également surreprésentées parmi les personnes dont les projets de migration sont seulement temporaires, par opposition à celles qui envisagent une migration de longue durée, voire définitive. Si l'âge affecte négativement les intentions migratoires, le niveau d'éducation n'a pas d'impact sur le fait d'envisager de travailler à l'étranger. Cependant, pour peu que l'on envisage de travailler à l'étranger, l'achèvement de la formation (au-delà de l'âge de 16 ans) est associé à des projets de migration de longue durée (au moins 5 ans), mais non définitive. Ces résultats suggèrent un potentiel de circulation des cerveaux plutôt que de fuite des cerveaux. En dernier lieu, les auteurs constatent que les variables socio-démographiques expliquent autant les variations dans les intentions migratoires que les facteurs incitatifs et dissuasifs spontanément indiqués et que les contraintes en matière migratoire.

### Zusammenfassung

Der Beitrag untersucht, inwieweit junge Menschen aus den neuen Mitgliedstaaten vor dem Hintergrund ungleicher Bedingungen in der erweiterten Europäischen Union zu Beginn der großen Krise die Migration gewählt haben. Der Artikel stützt sich auf Eurobarometer-Daten und wahrscheinlichkeitstheoretische, ökonometrische Modelle, um die wesentlichen Faktoren für die Absicht von Menschen, in einem anderen Mitgliedstaat des Europäischen Wirtschaftsraums (EWR) zu arbeiten, und die erwartete Dauer des Auslandsaufenthalts zu ermitteln. Wir stellen fest, dass die Migrationsabsicht unter Unverheirateten und unter Männern mit Kindern hoch ist, aber beide Kategorien gleichzeitig zu der Gruppe gehören, die nur vorübergehend und nicht langfristig oder dauerhaft ins Ausland zu gehen beabsichtigt. Während sich das Alter negativ auf die Migrationsneigung auswirkt, hat das Ausbildungsniveau keinen Einfluss darauf, ob ein Auslandsaufenthalt zu Arbeitszwecken beabsichtigt wird. Bei Personen, die eine Erwerbstätigkeit im Ausland in Erwägung ziehen, besteht jedoch ein Zusammenhang zwischen dem Abschluss der Ausbildung – sofern dieser nach dem 16. Lebensjahr erfolgt – und langfristigen (mindestens fünf Jahre), aber nicht dauerhaften Migrationsplänen. Diese Ergebnisse lassen eher auf ein Potenzial für zirkuläre Migration („brain circulation“) statt Abwanderung qualifizierter Arbeitskräfte („brain drain“) schließen. Abschließend stellt der Beitrag fest, dass soziodemografische Größen in mindestens ebenso großem Umfang Unterschiede in den Migrationsabsichten erklären wie selbst genannte Push- und Pullfaktoren und Migrationseinschränkungen.

### Keywords

EU labour markets, migration, young people, EU enlargement, labour mobility, free movement of workers, transitional arrangements, new Member States, European Union

### Introduction

The 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU extended freedom of movement to workers from 12 new Member States, mainly from central and eastern Europe.<sup>2</sup> The ensuing migration has generally proved to be a positive experience for the European Union and the pre-enlargement fears of the free

2 Including Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004 (EU-10) and Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 (EU-2). We denote the union of the two groups EU-12, and EU-8+2 whenever Cyprus and Malta are omitted.

labour mobility of new EU citizens turned out to be unjustified. No economically significant detrimental effects on the receiving countries' labour markets have been documented, nor has there been any evidence of statistically significant welfare shopping (Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2010). Rather, there appear to have been positive effects on EU productivity (Kahanec and Pytlíková, 2013). The sending countries face some risks of losing their young and skilled labour force, but free labour mobility has relieved them of some redundant labour and the associated fiscal burden during the recession of the late 2000s and early 2010s. They have also profited from remittances and the experience gained abroad proves useful upon return.<sup>3</sup>

The severe economic slowdown of the late 2000s and early 2010s, also dubbed the Great Recession, abruptly changed the migration landscape in Europe. Young people have disproportionately borne the economic adversities caused by the economic shocks that have asymmetrically affected countries and sectors in the European Union, struggling with exceptionally high unemployment rates in many EU Member States. Whereas before the Great Recession many young workers from the new Member States could have afforded to ignore the option of seeking employment abroad, or perceived it merely as a temptation, during the crisis for many of them this option turned to be the only possibility of finding a job.


The migration response of young people from the new Member States to the changing economic conditions has not yet been well documented. And yet their response critically conditions the capacity of the European Union – and the European Monetary Union in particular – to absorb asymmetric economic shocks and thus the European integration project itself. Indeed, the long-run capacity of the European Union to deal with global economic challenges crucially depends on the degree of mobility of its labour force. In this regard, permanent moves help to absorb current economic disparities, but do not provide for increased capacity to absorb ensuing economic shocks. Temporary migration trajectories, on the other hand, provide for a labour force that is more responsive to economic fluctuations.<sup>4</sup> Against the background of ageing populations, the temporal nature of youth mobility is of key importance from the perspective of economic potential and welfare sustainability in the sending countries.

This article explores the preferences of young people in the new Member States over migration strategies in the wake of the Great Recession of the late 2000s and early 2010s. We specifically distinguish mobility plans of short and long duration, and study the factors that determine the decision to move and – conditional on that decision – to stay in the destination country temporarily or permanently. For this purpose we use the Eurobarometer dataset 337, wave 72.5, from 2009, the year when the Great Recession started fully to affect EU labour markets. This dataset provides individual-level socio-economic data, including variables on migration intentions and their time frame. Binomial logistic regression models enable us to disentangle the main factors affecting

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3 For a general account see Kahanec (2013a), Kahanec and Zimmermann (2010) and Kureková (2011) and the literature cited in these works. Concerning the possible negative effects see, for example, Kaminska and Kahancová (2011) on the effect of out-migration on wages, Anderson et al. (2006) and Blanchflower and Lawton (2010) on migrants' life satisfaction, and Meardi (2011) and Galgóczi et al. (2012) on how enlargement interacted with the social fabric of Europe. For a general review of European migration see Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008) and Zimmermann (2005).

4 In the spirit of Hirschman (1970), from the perspective of the sending countries, permanent out-migration of young people can be interpreted as an 'exit' strategy driven by their frustration with the adverse labour market situation in the home country. On the other hand, temporary out-migration can be seen as an implicit 'voice' strategy indicating and reflecting the geographical inequality of opportunities across the European Union. See also Woolfson (2007) and Sommers and Woolfson (2008).



**Figure 1.** The share of young people (15–34) among all EU-12 migrants in the EU-15, by arrival (%).

Note: Migration status defined by place of birth, except for Germany for which due to data constraints nationality is used.  
Source: Authors' calculations based on the EU Labour Force Survey, 2010.

migration intentions, including standard socio-economic variables, as well as individual perceptions about key pull and push factors affecting their migration intentions.


We proceed as follows: Section 2 introduces the context of post-enlargement migration in the EU and briefly reviews the literature. Section 3 outlines the data and empirical strategy. Section 4 reports and interprets the result. Section 5 concludes.

## The scale and composition of migration in the EU following its eastern enlargement

The gradual extension of the right of free movement to new EU citizens brought about by the 2004 and 2007 enlargements enabled them to seek employment in the 15 'old' EU Member States (EU-15).<sup>5</sup> The higher standard of living in the old Member States lured many EU-12 citizens to pursue their careers in the EU-15. According to Holland et al. (2011), there were about one million citizens from the EU-8 and almost another million from the EU-2 in the EU-15 in 2004.<sup>6</sup> Only five years after the first enlargement, in 2009, the combined number of citizens from the new Member States in the EU-15 reached almost five million, split about equally between the 2004 and 2007

5 The 'transitional arrangements' allowed old Member States to impose restrictions on the access of new EU citizens to their labour markets, based on a 2+3+2 formula, with restrictions reviewed after two and three years, but lifted after seven years. Whereas some countries opened up their labour markets immediately upon enlargement (for example, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden for the 2004 entrants), others kept the restrictions until the last moment (for example, Austria and Germany for 2004 entrants). Kahanec (2013a) provides an up-to-date summary of the gradual liberalization. (EU-15 denotes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.)

6 See Kahanec (2013a) on the limitations of the data.



**Figure 2.** The share of females among EU-10+2 migrants in the EU-15, by age cohort (%).


Note: Migration status defined by place of birth, except for Germany for which due to data constraints nationality is used. 15–35 2004+ denotes migrants aged 15–35 and arriving after 2004. Source: Authors' calculations based on the EU Labour Force Survey, 2010.

entrants. This corresponds to 1.22 per cent of the total EU-15 population and 4.75 per cent of the combined populations of the new Member States (Kahanec, 2013a).

Kahanec (2013a, 2013b) reports the main migration trends in an enlarged EU from the sending countries' perspective. We observe a much heightened migration dynamic after the 2004 enlargement and a relatively abrupt slowdown – but not cessation – during the Great Recession. Relative to their populations, the countries sending the fewest labour migrants were the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia; those sending the most were Poland and Romania, as well as Bulgaria and Lithuania. As for the receiving countries, in 2009 Germany and the United Kingdom hosted about two-thirds of all new Member State migrants in the EU-15, but the primary destinations for EU-2 migrants were Spain and Italy (Kahanec, 2013a). One major trend was that the traditional destinations, such as Germany or Austria, for migrants from the new Member States lost their relative significance, whereas an increasing share of these migrants targeted new destination countries, such as Ireland, the United Kingdom or Spain.


Many of these movers were young workers and students, who generally only had limited labour market experience, were single and had no children (Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2010). As Figure 1 indicates, among migrants from the EU-12 in the EU-15, young people (aged 15 to 34) were over-represented in most countries. As can be expected, the share of young people among migrants is significantly higher after 2004, when the EU-10 countries joined the EU in all the EU-15 countries represented in Figure 1. The largest increase in the share of young migrants was observed in the Netherlands and Austria, but also Greece, Denmark and France.

Generally speaking, these young cohorts of migrants were gender-balanced, although a female-bias emerged in some countries. Among young migrants after 2004 the highest proportion of females were observed in Austria, France, Greece and the Netherlands (see Figure 2). On average post-enlargement migrants were well educated compared to the populations in the source but also destination countries (Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2010; Kahanec, 2013a).



**Figure 3.** The time frame of migration intentions.

Source: Authors' calculations based on Eurobarometer data 337, 72.5.



**Figure 4.** Intentions to work abroad and expected duration of stay abroad, by gender (%).

Source: Authors' calculation based on Eurobarometer data 337, 72.5.

## The data and analytical framework

The analysis in this article is based on data from Special Eurobarometer 337, wave 72.5, conducted between 13 November and 9 December 2009. A total of 26 761 inhabitants of the European Union Member States were surveyed, resulting in sample size of around 1 000 observations per country.<sup>7</sup> Probabilistic random sampling was employed to select surveyed households to ensure the representativeness for the population of the EU Member States aged 15 years or above.


A sub-set of the data has been selected for the purpose of this article, consisting of the residents of EU-8+2 countries aged 15 to 35, broadly representing young people in the new Member States.

<sup>7</sup> In the countries with smaller populations – for example, Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus – only about 500 observations were gathered.

**Table 1.** Intentions to work abroad, household type (%).

| Family status                      | No move | Up to 1 year | 1 to 5 years | More than 5 years |
|------------------------------------|---------|--------------|--------------|-------------------|
| Married, no children               | 71.26   | 5.39         | 7.78         | 15.57             |
| Living with partner, no children   | 57.19   | 7.49         | 18.86        | 16.47             |
| Single, no children                | 49.66   | 7.91         | 20.05        | 22.37             |
| Married, with children             | 78.12   | 5.26         | 5.40         | 11.22             |
| Living with partner, with children | 67.39   | 6.52         | 12.50        | 13.59             |
| Single, with children              | 62.00   | 9.00         | 9.00         | 20.00             |

Source: Authors' calculation based on Eurobarometer data 337, 72.5.

**Figure 5.** Intentions to work abroad, by age (%).

Source: Authors' calculation based on Eurobarometer data 337, 72.5.

From this sub-set we kept only those respondents who expressed a desire to work in a European country, either their own or another Member State of the European Economic Area (EEA), but not elsewhere. Through these procedures, a sample of 2 240 young residents of EU-8+2 was gained and used as a basis for statistical inference.

The key dependent variables were constructed using three questions from the Eurobarometer dataset about respondents' expectations regarding their migration. The first question asked whether the respondent envisages working outside his or her own country at some time in the future (question QC10). Based on this question, we constructed variable *Move*, that is, 1 if the answer is positive and zero otherwise. We then used question QC15: 'If you do have an intention to work outside [your own country], how long do you think you will be working there?' to measure the intended duration of their stay abroad. The range of responses included the following: a few weeks or less, a few months to less than 1 year, 1 year to less than 2 years, 2 years to less than 5 years, 5 years to less than 10 years, 10 years or more, as long as possible, until you retire, for the rest of your life. Based on this variable we constructed variable *Duration5*, with 1 for those intending to work abroad at least five years, and zero otherwise. Finally, we constructed variable *Permanent* based once again on the variable QC15, valued 1 if the respondent indicated a desire to move 'until you [they] retired' or 'for the rest of your [their] life', and zero otherwise. The frequencies of responses are reported in Figure 3.

A number of socio-demographic characteristics were scrutinized in relation to the intentions of the surveyed individuals to work in another European country vis-à-vis staying in their own

**Table 2.** Intentions to work abroad, by education (%).

| Age at completion of full-time education | No move | Up to 1 year | 1 to 5 years | More than 5 years |
|--|---------|--------------|--------------|-------------------|
| <16                                      | 62.86   | 10.29        | 13.71        | 13.14             |
| 16–18                                    | 72.09   | 4.60         | 10.12        | 13.19             |
| 19–21                                    | 69.34   | 6.61         | 9.42         | 14.63             |
| 22+                                      | 69.29   | 4.82         | 10.15        | 15.74             |
| Still studying                           | 63.57   | 6.74         | 13.13        | 16.56             |

Source: Authors' calculation based on Eurobarometer data 337, 72.5.

**Table 3.** Intentions to work abroad, by professional status (%).

| Professional status | No move | Up to 1 year | 1 year to 5 years | More than 5 years |
|---------------------|---------|--------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Self-employed       | 77.36   | 6.29         | 6.92              | 9.43              |
| Managers            | 64.32   | 6.10         | 10.33             | 19.25             |
| Other white-collar  | 78.38   | 3.30         | 8.11              | 10.21             |
| Manual workers      | 69.07   | 5.45         | 11.09             | 14.40             |
| Houseperson         | 80.09   | 4.42         | 7.96              | 7.52              |
| Unemployed          | 51.64   | 10.18        | 15.27             | 22.91             |
| Students            | 43.27   | 9.81         | 22.50             | 24.42             |

Source: Authors' calculation based on Eurobarometer data 337, 72.5.

country and the intended duration of working abroad. As is evident from Figure 4, men are more likely to look for work beyond the borders of their own country. While approximately 70 per cent of young females in the EU-8+2 signalled no desire to move, only a little more than a half of their male counterparts expressed similar intentions. Among eastern Europeans who expressed intentions to work abroad in the future a majority also expressed a preference for seeking a longer-term arrangement abroad, lasting for at least one year.

Table 1 shows that the family situation strongly correlates with migration intentions. Only about 22 per cent of married respondents with children reported intentions to move, while more than half of singles<sup>8</sup> with no children foresaw themselves working in another EU Member State. Married couples, regardless of whether with children or not, are less migration-prone than cohabiting couples, who were in turn less interested in migration than singles. Across these three categories, respondents with children were more likely to stay at home than childless members of their respective group. As far as the expected duration of migration experience is concerned, respondents with children are clustered in both 'up to 1 year' and more than '5 years', while childless respondents seemed to be more open to medium-term migration.

As far as age is concerned, the younger people are (within the 15–35 cohort) the more likely they are to expect to move abroad to work (see Figure 5). Only slightly more than 40 per cent of people under 18 signal no intention to seek work abroad, while the corresponding figure for those aged 30–35 is about 75 per cent. A similar pattern emerges for the prevalence of expectations about stays abroad of long duration (more than five years), which also declines with age.

8 This category includes all respondents without a partner.



**Table 4.** Push and pull factors and constraints of migration propensity.

| Push and pull factors  | Constraints   |
|--|---|
| Better quality of life abroad                                      | Your home is here   |
| Better working conditions abroad                                   | You would not want to impose big changes on your family and/or children |
| Better career or business opportunities abroad                     | You do not want to leave your friends behind                            |
| Better chances of finding employment abroad                        | It is difficult to learn a new language                                 |
| To discover something new and meet new people                      | You do not want to give up your house or other property                 |
| To improve your qualifications (for example, learn a new language) | You already have a good job here  |
| Better economic climate abroad                                     | It is too much of an effort to go and work abroad                       |
| To be closer to relatives or friends who live abroad               | The cost of living is too high abroad                                   |
| Better social and health care system abroad                        | The quality of life abroad is worse                                     |
| Better political situation abroad                                  | The attitude towards foreigners abroad is hostile                       |
|  | The political situation abroad is worse                                 |
|  | You don't feel qualified enough to work abroad                          |
|  | The economic climate abroad is worse                                    |
|  | Yourself or your friends/relatives have had bad experiences abroad      |

Table 2 reveals that no straightforward patterns of relationship between education and migration expectations emerge, although students and those completing their education before their 16th birthday appear to be more mobile.

Finally, it is possible to identify three levels of migration propensity in relation to professional affiliation. At the top, the unemployed, like students, are very prone to looking for work abroad; about half of them intend to do so. In contrast, self-employed individuals, non-managerial white-collar workers and especially housepersons do not seem very mobile. Managers and manual workers are somewhere in between, with about one-third of them expecting to work in another European country. These patterns are also visible for the expected duration of stay abroad, with students, the unemployed and managers expecting longer-term commitments; whereas housepersons and the self-employed appear to have more temporary plans.

These descriptive statistics reveal a number of interesting patterns. Young male singles without children, still studying or with little education, or unemployed, appear to be most likely to expect future mobility. However, there may be more complex interactions among these variables, which may confound some of this descriptive inference. For example, age and student status are correlated, and simple statistics do not disentangle their independent effects on migration expectations. Other variables, such as having children, may have different effects for males and females.

To pinpoint and measure robust determinants of young people's migration intentions, we use binomial Logit models predicting the probability of expectations to move, and to move for longer durations. Among the key explanatory variables we include gender, age, professional and marital status, having children or not and educational attainment. These models disentangle conditional correlations among the studied variables and also enable us to look also at the interaction effects of gender and having children. The inclusion of country fixed effects controls for cross-sectional variation that invariably characterizes each country, including country-specific push factors.

Additionally, the dataset enables us to look at the effects of a set of variables measuring the subjective stance of respondents on various factors enhancing or limiting their propensity to migrate.

**Table 5.** Determinants of migration intentions.

|   | Move<br>(1)              | Duration5<br>(2)      | Permanent<br>(3)       | Move<br>(4)              | Duration5<br>(5)      | Permanent<br>(6)      |
|---|--------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Gender: female                                  | -0.0527*<br>(0.0283)     | -0.000629<br>(0.0451) | 0.00770<br>(0.0152)    | -0.0421<br>(0.0294)      | 0.0321<br>(0.0477)    | 0.0103<br>(0.0128)    |
| Age (years)                                     | -0.00985***<br>(0.00281) | 0.000919<br>(0.00489) | 0.00330**<br>(0.00135) | -0.00827***<br>(0.00296) | -0.00296<br>(0.00523) | 0.00224*<br>(0.00118) |
| Profession: self-employed                       | -0.125*<br>(0.0704)      | -0.190<br>(0.125)     | 0.0245<br>(0.0304)     | -0.0429<br>(0.0729)      | -0.250*<br>(0.133)    | 0.0289<br>(0.0258)    |
| Profession: manager                             | -0.00390<br>(0.0675)     | -0.0978<br>(0.115)    | 0.0276<br>(0.0285)     | 0.0657<br>(0.0704)       | -0.13<br>(0.122)      | 0.0232<br>(0.0249)    |
| Profession: white-collar                        | -0.147**<br>(0.0622)     | -0.102<br>(0.106)     | 0.0320<br>(0.0264)     | -0.0677<br>(0.0643)      | -0.151<br>(0.113)     | 0.0326<br>(0.0230)    |
| Profession: houseperson                         | -0.112*<br>(0.0667)      | -0.313***<br>(0.121)  | -0.0172<br>(0.0310)    | -0.0809<br>(0.0702)      | -0.335***<br>(0.128)  | -0.0144<br>(0.0258)   |
| Profession: unemployed                          | 0.0718<br>(0.0550)       | -0.0851<br>(0.0881)   | 0.00540<br>(0.0233)    | 0.0777<br>(0.0577)       | -0.145<br>(0.0934)    | 0.00823<br>(0.0201)   |
| Profession: manual worker                       | -0.0976*<br>(0.0560)     | -0.132<br>(0.0963)    | 0.0305<br>(0.0244)     | -0.0365<br>(0.0587)      | -0.176*<br>(0.101)    | 0.0290<br>(0.0211)    |
| Lives with a partner                            | 0.0770**<br>(0.0322)     | -0.108*<br>(0.0585)   | -0.0347**<br>(0.0166)  | 0.0717**<br>(0.0333)     | -0.143**<br>(0.0621)  | -0.0334**<br>(0.0142) |
| Lives alone                                     | 0.103***<br>(0.0338)     | -0.0437<br>(0.0594)   | -0.0323**<br>(0.0150)  | 0.0907***<br>(0.0351)    | -0.0724<br>(0.0627)   | -0.0289**<br>(0.0129) |
| Has children                                    | 0.207**<br>(0.0804)      | -0.256*<br>(0.138)    | -0.0790*<br>(0.0409)   | 0.275***<br>(0.0824)     | -0.255*<br>(0.145)    | -0.0623*<br>(0.0344)  |
| Gender x Children                               | -0.159***<br>(0.0477)    | 0.202**<br>(0.0834)   | 0.0443*<br>(0.0238)    | -0.177***<br>(0.0487)    | 0.212**<br>(0.0880)   | 0.0347*<br>(0.0200)   |
| Age at completion of full-time education: 16–18 | -0.0260<br>(0.0452)      | 0.134*<br>(0.0790)    | -0.0429**<br>(0.0192)  | -0.0472<br>(0.0470)      | 0.183**<br>(0.0837)   | -0.0395**<br>(0.0168) |
| Age at completion of full-time education: 19–21 | -0.000641<br>(0.0472)    | 0.135*<br>(0.0819)    | -0.0367*<br>(0.0190)   | -0.0375<br>(0.0490)      | 0.202**<br>(0.0865)   | -0.0287*<br>(0.0161)  |
| Age at completion of full-time education: >22   | -0.0136<br>(0.0507)      | 0.134<br>(0.0887)     | -0.0378*<br>(0.0204)   | -0.0725<br>(0.0529)      | 0.214**<br>(0.0948)   | 0.0103<br>(0.0128)    |
| Country fixed effects                           | Yes                      | Yes                   | Yes                    | Yes                      | Yes                   | Yes                   |
| Push&Pull factors and constraints               | No                       | No                    | No                     | Yes                      | Yes                   | Yes                   |
| Constant  | 0.215**<br>(0.0876)      | -0.0939<br>(0.150)    | -0.198***<br>(0.0517)  | 0.0796<br>(0.0962)       | 0.0894<br>(0.173)     | -0.171***<br>(0.0481) |
| Observations                                    | 2240                     | 816                   | 773                    | 2240                     | 816                   | 773                   |
| chi2  | 352.16                   | 33.60                 | 41.02                  | 540.44                   | 87.97                 | 35.39                 |
| Prob > chi2                                     | 0.0000                   | 0.0921                | 0.118                  | 0.0000                   | 0.0005                | 0.1588                |
| Pseudo R2                                       | 0.1447                   | 0.0326                | 0.1524                 | 0.2632                   | 0.0935                | 0.1980                |

Notes: Marginal effects from binomial Logit regressions of reported variables on the probability of expectations to move sometime in the future (columns 1 and 4), stay there for at least 5 years (2 and 5), and stay there permanently (3 and 6). The excluded category is married male without children who still studies or completed his studies before his 16th birthday. \*/\*\*/\*\*\* Indicate significance at the 10%/5%/1% level.

These variables are listed in Table 4. Including these variables in the analysis enables us to disentangle the effects of socio-demographic variables from perceived push and pull factors and constraints relevant for the migration intentions of young people in new Member States.

**Table 6.** Impact of push and pull factors and constraints.

|  | Push and pull factors |                      |                       | Constraints   |                      |            |
|--|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|---|----------------------|------------|
|  | (4)                   | (5)                  | (6)                   | (4 cont'd)  | (5 cont'd)           | (6 cont'd) |
| Better chances of finding employment abroad          | 0.204***<br>(0.0258)  | -0.0762*<br>(0.0456) | -0.00924<br>(0.0101)  | Your home is here<br>-0.288***<br>(0.0249)  | -0.0558<br>(0.0429)  | N/A        |
| Better working conditions abroad                     | 0.186***<br>(0.0251)  | 0.027<br>(0.0427)    | 0.00286<br>(0.00946)  | You would not impose big changes on family/children<br>-0.107***<br>(0.0280)              | -0.111**<br>(0.0499) | N/A        |
| Better career opportunities abroad                   | 0.128***<br>(0.0277)  | 0.0924*<br>(0.0483)  | N/A                   | You do not want to leave your friends behind<br>-0.100***<br>(0.0273)                     | -0.0619<br>(0.0456)  | N/A        |
| To be closer to relatives or friends who live abroad | 0.0961**<br>(0.0457)  | -0.084<br>(0.0835)   | N/A                   | You do not want to give up your house/other property<br>-0.148***<br>(0.0337)             | -0.160**<br>(0.0625) | N/A        |
| To discover something new and meet new people        | 0.232***<br>(0.0323)  | -0.118**<br>(0.0531) | N/A                   | You already have a good job here<br>-0.238***<br>(0.0339)                                 | -0.0864<br>(0.0611)  | N/A        |
| To improve qualifications (e.g. learn a language)    | 0.159***<br>(0.0289)  | -0.107**<br>(0.0499) | N/A                   | It is too much effort to go and work abroad<br>-0.172***<br>(0.0374)                      | -0.126*<br>(0.0695)  | N/A        |
| Better quality of life abroad                        | 0.165***<br>(0.0243)  | 0.066<br>(0.0434)    | 0.0228**<br>(0.00929) | It is difficult to learn a new language<br>-0.191***<br>(0.0336)                          | 0.00953<br>(0.0587)  | N/A        |
| Better political situation abroad                    | 0.121**<br>(0.0517)   | 0.187**<br>(0.0849)  | N/A                   | The cost of living is too high abroad<br>-0.0964***<br>(0.0341)                           | 0.0548<br>(0.0594)   | N/A        |
| Better economic climate abroad                       | 0.219***<br>(0.0316)  | -0.0677<br>(0.0521)  | 0.00523<br>(0.0105)   | Yourself or your friends/relatives have had bad experiences abroad<br>-0.0382<br>(0.0526) | -0.150*<br>(0.0869)  | N/A        |

(continued)

**Table 6.** (continued)

|   | Push and pull factors |                    |                      | Constraints  |                     |            |
|---|-----------------------|--------------------|----------------------|--|---------------------|------------|
|   | (4)                   | (5)                | (6)                  | (4 cont'd)   | (5 cont'd)          | (6 cont'd) |
| Better social and health care system abroad | 0.0567*<br>(0.0323)   | 0.102*<br>(0.0574) | 0.0267**<br>(0.0108) | You do not feel qualified enough to work abroad<br>-0.171***<br>(0.0465) | -0.105<br>(0.0873)  | N/A        |
| Other reasons                               | 0.183*<br>(0.0952)    | 0.111<br>(0.175)   | N/A                  | The quality of life abroad is worse<br>-0.0998*<br>(0.0561)              | -0.0864<br>(0.0943) | N/A        |
|   |                       |                    |                      | The political situation abroad is worse<br>0.0172<br>(0.0725)            | 0.144<br>(0.109)    | N/A        |
|   |                       |                    |                      | The economic climate abroad is worse<br>-0.107<br>(0.0702)               | -0.0429<br>(0.105)  | N/A        |
|   |                       |                    |                      | The attitude towards foreigners abroad is hostile<br>-0.0321<br>(0.0344) | -0.0224<br>(0.0567) | N/A        |

Notes: Marginal effects from binomial Logit regressions of reported variables on the probability of expectations to move some time in the future (column 4), stay there for at least 5 years (5), and stay there permanently (6) corresponding to the respective columns of Table 5. N/A represents variables excluded due to fewer than 10 observations identifying the coefficient (the results in Table 5 are robust to exclusion or inclusion of such variables). \*, \*\*, \*\*\* Indicate significance at the 10%/5%/1% level.

## The results

The results from binomial Logit regressions are reported in Table 5 above. Among the positive factors for intentions to move to another EEA country we identify not being married (whether single or cohabiting with a partner) and being a male with children. This finding and the insignificance of the coefficient with gender indicates that the correlation of gender and migration intentions arises through the gendered response of households to the presence of children, and not as a direct effect of gender. The negative factors include age and working in a white-collar job. While upon the inclusion of self-reported push and pull factors and constraints the latter effect disappears, the inclusion of push and pull factors and constraints does not qualitatively alter the results for the socio-demographic variables. Interestingly, education has essentially no effect on intentions to work abroad.

A somewhat different picture emerges when it comes to expected duration of stay abroad for people intending to work abroad in the future.<sup>9</sup> Being a houseperson reduces the chance of expecting to stay abroad for at least five years; this effect is not present if we look at intentions to stay permanently. Living with a partner as opposed to being married appears to reduce the probability of expecting the duration of staying abroad to be at least five years, as well as – although to a smaller degree – staying abroad permanently. There is an indication of a similar negative effect on the intention to move permanently of being single. Remarkably, conditional on expecting to move, men with children expect a shorter duration of stay, below five years. This may signify circular or seasonal migratory trajectories of male breadwinners and, as mentioned above, a gendered response to the presence of children in the household. Interestingly, education gains importance, with more educated migrants (completing their education after their 16th birthday, in other words, not students or low educated) exhibiting a higher probability of expecting stays lasting for at least five years. This effect is not present, and perhaps even reverses, when it comes to intentions to move permanently. Generally, the inclusion of self-reported push and pull factors and constraints increases the precision and explanatory power of our regression models.<sup>10</sup>

It is interesting to observe that the effects of socio-demographic characteristics on migration expectations are fairly independent of the studied self-reported pull and push factors and migration constraints. We report in Table 6 (above) the coefficients for these factors corresponding to columns 4–6 in Table 5. We observe that most of these factors are significant predictors (of the expected sign) of intentions to move. Better labour market opportunities, political or economic climate, but also social networks abroad are important push and pull factors. Interestingly, consistent with the findings of Giulietti et al. (2013) social and health care factors are not strongly related to the decision to move, although there appears to be a small statistically significant positive effect, along with quality of life, on interest in moving permanently.

Conditional on intending to move, those who want to discover something new or improve their qualifications, or have concerns about the migration-related costs to their family, children or friends, or own a house or other property in their home country, tend to prefer migratory moves

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9 We report the results for intended duration of stay of at least five years or permanently. We also considered an alternative measure with the duration threshold of 1 year. The results, available upon request, were essentially the same as those pertaining to the threshold of five years reported in columns 2 and 5 of Table 5. We also tested the robustness of our predictions using an ordered Logit model. The results, available upon request, are fully consistent with those obtained from binomial Logit models.

10 Importantly, all respondents were asked the questions about push and pull factors and constraints regarding their actual or hypothetical migration plans.

of shorter duration. Those who perceive the efforts needed to migrate as high, already have a good job, find it difficult to learn a new language, do not feel sufficiently qualified, perceive the cost of living abroad as high, or have a strong emotional relationship to their home country tend to have a lower propensity to migrate.

## Conclusions and implications

In this article we address the question of how young people in new EU Member States responded to their newly acquired right freely to move for work within the European Union against the background of economic developments at the onset of the Great Recession. We review the literature and descriptively analyse the EU LFS data from 2010 to find that young people in the new Member States have reacted vigorously to the (prospect of) accession of their countries to the European Union. Can these significant migration flows be considered permanent, signifying exit from the sending countries, or did the young people have just temporary migration plans, thus with their mobility decisions rather implicitly voicing their discontent with the socio-economic situation in their home countries?

To answer this question we studied the migration intentions of young people in new Member States using the Eurobarometer 337, wave 72.5, database. We distinguished between temporary and permanent migration intentions by looking at the expected duration of working abroad. Disentangling a number of interacting factors using a binomial Logit model, we find that the only variables that matter significantly in the statistical sense and thus have an independent effect on the probability of intentions to work abroad are age (negative), not being married and having children if male (positive).

We further looked at the determinants of the expected duration of the intended working abroad. The analysis has shown that among the most loyal young people – namely, not intending to stay abroad for more than five years – are housepersons, men with children and those living with a partner (but not married). Those with completed education (if after their 16th birthday) are more likely to report intentions to stay abroad more than five years, but less likely to report permanent migration intentions. Beyond the completion threshold the level of education does not seem to matter much, however, indicating that, at least measured by intentions, there is little selection on formal education of migrants into temporary and longer or permanent migration plans.

The analysis of push and pull factors and migration constraints indicates that social, economic and political conditions abroad, as well as existing social networks abroad, all increase the propensity to indicate migratory intentions. Interestingly, the effect of the perception of a better social and health care system abroad ends up only marginally significant, although there appears to be a small positive and statistically significant effect on permanent migratory intentions. On the other hand, various constraints related to the perceived costs of migration are very relevant factors that limit migration intentions.

Interestingly, when it comes to the desired duration of intended working abroad, among the young people most loyal to their home country – that is, intending to return within five years of departure – are those who only want to discover something new or improve their qualifications, and who do not want to impose big changes on their family or children, or do not want to leave property behind. Those discontented with the political situation at home are considerably less loyal, however.

These findings indicate that post-enlargement migration of young workers from new Member States to more advanced European economies can be seen as a signal of socio-economic disparities in an enlarged European Union. A non-negligible fraction of young people report intentions of

long-term working abroad, indicating some preference for long-term or permanent exit from their home countries. A larger share, however, appear to be attached to their home countries, reporting preferences for stays abroad of shorter duration, and thus with their migration plans signalling their discontent with their present situation. Having completed education and family status appear to be the key socio-demographic drivers of the choice between the two strategies.

In relation to the debate about circular migration and brain circulation, our findings indicate that there is little evidence of a significant educational gradient, or brain drain, in selection to permanent migration. On the other hand, improvement in the political situation, quality of social and health care system, and quality of life are desirable on the assumption that temporary migration trajectories are preferred to long-term or permanent exits.

Socio-demographic variables and perceived pull and push factors and constraints on people's migration decisions independently explain a similar fraction of the variation in migration intentions. The significance of education and family status implies that at a certain stage of people's life cycle, migration is more likely to be perceived as a viable alternative. In addition, a number of push and pull factors indicate that discovering something new, improving one's qualifications or simply career opportunities are important determinants of migration decisions among young workers from new EU Member States. This signals that youth migration intentions can be interpreted as signalling that, at least in part, young post-enlargement migrants can be viewed as 'choice' migrants, as proposed by Kureková (2011). Fresh and recent graduates planning their future career and making family choices are thus the social group that appears to be more responsive to policy intervention regarding their mobility choices and temporal nature of their migration plans. Overall, based on the analysis of migration intentions there appears to exist a potential for brain circulation rather than brain drain.

## Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

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